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search-and-rescue operations. The authors argue that because these steps are
limited, practical, and focus on the interests of all sides, China may be willing
to engage here, and that further, because of Tehran’s desire to stay on good
terms with Beijing, Chinese participation might induce some restraint on
Iran’s part.
The Vital Triangle is well worth reading.
It provides a useful contextual framework for placing in perspective overhyped news reports on Sino-U.S.
disputes over Chinese arms deals with
countries in the region, Beijing’s growing concerns about ensuring the security of its oil imports, threats from
Egypt and Saudi Arabia that they may
seek Beijing’s political-military support
as an alternative to Washington, and attempts by Iran to appeal to China as a
counterweight to Western pressures.
Because the book cogently illustrates
Beijing’s reluctance to take risks or
choose sides and thereby diminishes the
credibility of China as a counterweight,
Americans working diplomatically in
the Mideast could even find it useful to
provide copies to their host-country interlocutors the next time they try to
play “the China card.”
ROBERT A. HARRIS

Defense Intelligence Agency, Burke, Va.
(The views and opinions expressed in this review are
the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense, or U.S. government.)
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In an August 2009 Wall Street Journal
article, Seth Jones described meeting
villagers in Afghanistan who had never
heard of President Hamid Karzai and
even thought the U.S. military forces he
was traveling with were Soviets, “not realizing that the Soviet army withdrew in
1989.” This lack of knowledge may
seem implausible in an era of cell phone
and Internet communication, but Jones
offers a detailed narrative of the historical and modern-day challenges in Afghanistan that makes this ignorance
believable. He describes a country populated by diverse ethnic tribes with
strong aversions to central governance.
As the title implies, he recalls the failure
of foreign forces time and again to tame
and govern this disparate Afghan populace. From Alexander the Great in 330
BC to the British Empire in the nineteenth century, to the Soviet invasion of
the 1970s, Afghanistan has been seemingly unconquerable. Against this background Jones demonstrates the
monumental challenge that the United
States faces as it attempts to do what
other “empires” could not—“create a
new order” in Afghanistan. He clearly
demonstrates that “the lessons from the
past empires provide a stark lesson.”
A well-respected political scientist at
RAND, Seth Jones clearly has the credibility to take on the task of breaking
down and explaining the complicated
Afghan environment. Jones is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, has taught at the Naval
Postgraduate School, and has visited
Afghanistan numerous times since 11
September 2001. In the Graveyard of
Empires is painstakingly researched,
with over a thousand notes citing interviews, documents, books, news articles,
video clips, and written statements
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from numerous U.S. and international
figures who have played prominent
roles in Afghanistan since before and
after 9/11. In fact, Jones’s many citations and his approach of listing diverse
players with one-line, anecdotal physical descriptions or personality traits can
be overwhelming and even detract from
the narrative.
Nonetheless, this book does a superb
job of filling in the details of Afghanistan’s complex politics for scholars who
are interested in gaining a better understanding of the history, the state and
nonstate actors involved, and the many
civil and military leaders who have attempted to calm the political upheaval
in Afghanistan. Jones ably explains
how, after the United States and its allies quickly knocked the Taliban from
power, routed al-Qa‘ida, and set up a
popularly elected central government,
the country nonetheless failed to establish an adequate justice system and security for its populace—instead
allowing a robust insurgency to develop. With the experience of someone
who has walked the ground and talked
to the leaders on all sides, Jones effectively argues that the drug trade, highlevel government corruption, and the
lack of resources could, if not resolved,
lead to one more headstone in Afghanistan’s graveyard.
DOUGLAS J. WADSWORTH

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Naval War College
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Lee Zatarain, an attorney, has crafted a
compelling and immensely readable account of one of the least-known chapters
of the U.S. Navy’s maritime combat operations, the tanker war of 1987–88. The
tanker war was fought by three now very
familiar foes—Iran and Iraq (who had
been at war with each other since 1980),
and the United States, which became
embroiled in the conflict when an Iraqi
aircraft attacked and nearly sank one of
its frontline warships in 1987. Using new
information gained from the U.S. Navy
and other U.S. government sources, as
well as extensive interviews with the officers and crew who served in the Persian
Gulf during the fifteen-month war,
Zatarain examines and explains with
lawyerly precision the events that constituted the U.S. Navy’s combat operations
against Iranian naval forces.
Tanker War begins with a detailed account of the Iraqi attack on the guidedmissile frigate USS Stark in May 1987;
the first successful antiship-missile attack on a U.S. Navy warship, it resulted
in thirty-seven deaths. That attack,
however, precipitated no military response against Iraq by the United
States, largely because it was considered
to have been an unfortunate accident,
and Iraq was more of a friend than Iran.
Iran’s subsequent actions—laying
mines in the heavily trafficked channels
of the Gulf to interrupt the flow of Iraqi
oil and attacking civilian oil tankers—
forced the United States to side with
Iraq. As Zatarain explains in straightforward fashion, the conflict that ensued nearly cost the U.S. Navy another
warship, USS Samuel B. Roberts, and
subjected the Navy to several antishipmissile attacks by the Iranian military.
In retaliation, the U.S. Navy destroyed a
good part of the Iranian navy and
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